Principle-agent analysis of technology project (LINCOS) in Costa Rica by MAMOON, Dawood & HERNANDEZ, Silvia
Journal of 
Social and Administrative Sciences 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 4                           December 2017                             Issue 4 
 
Principle-Agent Analysis of Technology Project 
(LINCOS) in Costa Rica 
 
By Dawood MAMOON a† & Silvia HERNANDEZab 
 
Abstract. In this paper we analyze the institutional arrangement between various actors to 
understand how ICT project objectives flow among actors in a standard LINCOS project 
and how they would affect the sustainability and effectiveness of LINCOS in particular and 
an ICT project in general. Since there are many actors involved in different stages and 
processes of a single LINCOS project, the paper analyses the bilateral and multilateral 
relationships among these actors to understand the factors that might affect the efficiency of 
the ICT project. In other words the paper looks at the actors involved in a LINCOS project 
in an effort to capture those circumstances under which a LINCOS project is exposed to 
principal- agent problems. 
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1. Introduction 
oday, when the technological revolution is transforming the lives of those 
who are connected to it, the issue of access to information technology is 
becoming increasingly relevant in every part of the world. Thus it is 
indispensable for a country to be prepared for such changes (Human Development 
Report, 2001). Costa Rica is one of the smaller Latin American countries, inhabited 
by only 4 million people. However, it is one of the more developed Latin American 
nations, known for its social and cultural homogeneity, political stability and 
democratic traditions. It is also one of the few countries in the world that does not 
have an army and instead, since 1949, successive governments have channeled 
public resources to the improvement of general public welfare rather than using 
them on amassing weaponry. Thus it is not a surprise that today Costa Rica is one 
of the more developed countries among its regional counterparts, with superior 
social and human development indicators (refer to Table 1) that it is definitely a 
fine example to follow (Garnier 1998; Human Development Report, 2001). 
 
Table 1. Indicators of the Evolution of Social Development in Costa Rica 1940-2000 
Indicator 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Adult Illiteracy (% of population older than 15 years old) 27.0 21.0 16.0 13.0 10.0 7.0 4.0* 
Years of Education (for more than 25 years old) n.a. 3.1 3.6 5.3 5.9 6.5 6.7* 
Life Expectancy (years) 46.9 55.6 62.5 65.4 72.6 75.6 77.4* 
Infant Mortality (1000 births) 137.0 95.0 80.0 67.0 21.0 15 10.2* 
Human Development Index (%) n.a. n.a. 55.0 64.7 74.6 84.8 79.7* 
Note: n.a.: Not available. Source: Garnier et al., 1998; *Estado de la Nación, 2004. 
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In the technology sphere, the country has also achieved positive technology 
introductions as suggested in the 2001 Human Development Report; Costa Rica 
has developed its human capital to utilize these new technologies efficiently. In 
effect, as the Human Development Index shows, the country had shifted from a 
medium human development level to a high one of almost 80% in the year 2000. 
For the same year, the illiteracy rate was merely 4 percentage points (Garnier et al., 
1998; Estado de la Nación, 2004) indicating an educated environment, and this has 
boosted the use of ‘new’ technologies.  
Irrespective of these overall national achievements apropos economic 
development, one is confronted with a different reality when inter-regional 
differences are taken into account because significant inequalities prevail between 
urban and rural areas of Costa Rica. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of School Attendance for the Population over 5 years, per Region and 
Sex 
  Costa Rica Urban Region Rural Region 
Age Groups Total Men Women Men Women Men Women 
5-6 years old 64.6 64.4 64.8 72.1 72.3 55.4 56.0 
7-12 years old 95.7 95.5 95.9 97.3 97.5 93.3 93.8 
13-19 years old 61.3 59.9 62.7 69.0 71.3 47.7 50.4 
20-29 years old 22.8 21.9 23.7 28.2 29.6 12.5 14.4 
30 years old and more 4.6 4.4 4.9 5.8 5.9 2.5 3.0 
Source: Population Census 2000, INEC 
 
For example, Table 2 shows that, out of the rural population aged between 25 
and 49, more than two thirds barely have 6 years of schooling, whereas in urban 
areas the corresponding figure is less than one third. One of major reasons for this 
situation is the fact that people do not have enough financial resources to afford 
education (refer to Graph 1) (Estado de la Nación, 2000:87). One way to make 
education accessible to the rural poor is to make it cheaper and efficient by 
utilizing ‘new’ technologies. 
 
 
Graph 1. Various Causes of Non-School Attendance of the Population between 5 and 17 
years of age 
Source: Households surveys, INEC, 2000. 
 
There is a greater need of technologies that can provide access to information, 
especially in the rural areas, and to reduce the digital divide.1 Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) can be identified as such technologies which, 
under the right conditions (for example, effective use of it and equal access to it), 
can not only improve the skills of the targeted population through better knowledge 
but also enable them to have better income opportunities (Schech 2002; Rodriguez 
2001; Colle 2000; Escobar 1995).  However, rural areas generally lack easy access 
to these Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) because of complex 
conditions. For example, because of their remote geographical locations most rural 
areas have poor infrastructure, which makes it difficult for the availability of ICTs 
(Okot-Uma, 1992 cited by Ghimire, 1997). Therefore ICT provision to rural areas 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 4(4), D. Mamoon, & S. Hernandez, p.320-351. 
322 
is generally a challenge and a tough task. But it is necessary to take up this 
challenge because ICTs are cheaper and efficient modes of knowledge 
dissemination, and this is a pre-requisite for the improvement in rural livelihoods.  
Yet, the provision of ICTs generally involves many actors and as a result quite 
many processes. These actors can be the State, a Northern NGO, a Southern NGO 
or both and/or local communities, and these actors interact with each other at 
various stages of a standard ICT project. In an effort to identify the most efficient 
ways of ICT provision, one has to critically evaluate the role of these actors 
individually and/or in a group. For example, it is imperative to know how different 
intermediaries2 as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) come into action to 
play a role in the transfer of technology by implementing ICT projects that can 
facilitate the access to various technology tools in areas where technology 
introduction is difficult (Colle, 2000). 
This paper intends to look at one such intermediary NGO in Costa Rica, namely 
the Costa Rican Foundation for Sustainable Development (CRFSD). This 
Foundation is an idea of the former president of Costa Rica, Jose María Figueres 
Olsen who initiated an ICT project called ‘the Little Intelligent Communities’ 
(LINCOS). CRFSD has also involved various national and international aid 
agencies /donors in the promotion of its project. 
As a result, the CRFSD has to go through different steps before each LINCOS 
project is finally implemented and considered ready for its use by the targeted 
population. These steps form the project chain, which covers all the processes that 
a project has to deal with, making up for the complete institutional arrangement 
whereby different relationships and interests are covered and roles of different 
actors involved are identified.  
The major focus of the study is to identify relationships between the various 
actors involved in a standard LINCOS project and the way in which those 
relationships may have influenced the efficiency of the project by looking at all the 
actors involved and the course of actions taken by them. 
There are ‘hard’ factors or material infrastructure requirements (e.g. 
components of electricity, hardware and software platforms) to provide access to 
ICTs, and there is also a need for the so-called ‘soft’ infrastructure (e.g. financial 
and negotiation factors) to support the diffusion and the use of these technologies 
(Chepaitis, 2002). This paper centers its attention on the soft factors, which 
construct the institutional arrangement and, in particular, it examines the 
relationship between the different actors involved in the ICT project. 3 
For a better understanding, a graphic representation of the ICT project chain is 
presented in figure 1 in appendix A. The chain provides a general overview of 
different actors and processes involved in every step of the ICT project. Following 
the steps identified in this ICT project chain, the paper attempts to show if the 
different actors are meeting the project’s objectives and if they all have same 
objectives. This will also provide us with the information to know how every step 
has defined the actual purpose of the project, even though the purpose may be 
officially the same.  
In this chain analysis, the paper seeks to identify the role played by the actors, 
giving special emphasis to the NGO (CRFSD) and its relationships with the 
donors4, State5 and with the LINCOS’ management membership based organization 
(MBO). To this end, we can consider the positive connotations and different 
problems that arise from different actors’ interventions. Such an approach will help 
me to identify if some actors can lead to the creation of new relationships of 
dependency, where some of them may have more power to take decisions and 
impose conditionality on the others. 
 Since it is anticipated that (as it is the case now) the majority of the world’s 
rural population will not own ICTs in the near future and most will probably not be 
direct users of ICTs - many countries are trying to reverse such trends. ICTs are 
identified as an important means of sustainable development and efficiency in 
communities - be they rural or urban.  
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To this effect, in many developing countries, a wide range of organizations –
national and international- are promoting and supporting the creation of entities 
that can make ICTs available on an affordable basis to everyone. Much of this 
attention is now on ‚NGOs and their initiatives toward applying ICTs and 
telecenters toward development‛ (Colle, 2000:4). 
In this paper, evaluation of the CRFSD as one of those intermediary entities, 
and the analysis of its ICT project is used to understand what steps are involved in 
a project before people get access to it. As mentioned earlier, an ICT project entails 
a chain of different steps and actors before its outputs reach recipients. The analysis 
of any such steps that allow the information to flow from a ‘top’ initiative idea to 
the ‘bottom’- to hitherto disconnected people - provides a useful framework for any 
efficient ICT project implementation. Such an approach gives an understanding of 
the processes that may delay or accelerate the ICT connectivity to the rural people.  
In short, ICT projects are worth analyzing to understand the institutional 
arrangement that lies behind them, especially since the analysis of such 
partnerships and relationships in ICT projects have not been covered extensively 
by the existing literature (Brehm, 2001). 
It was possible for me to gather good background knowledge about my case 
study as I have been working with the CFRSD. It has been both a challenge and a 
moving learning exercise to explore the relationships between the NGO and the 
donors, the state and the community management based organization (MBO) as 
actors involved in LINCOS. 
The objectives of this study are to: 
a) Identify those steps in the structure of the project that may delay or 
accelerate the access of information to the targeted population; 
b) Analyze the NGO objectives in relation to those of its partners, donors, 
State and the community organization (MBO) involved. (Does everybody want the 
same thing? Do objectives of the NGO clash with those of the donors and do these 
differences influence the objectives of the NGO? How are actors influencing the 
project?) 
This research seeks to examine some of the factors that may inhibit or foster 
access to ICTs. There will be a further focus on other specific sub-questions: 
a) How do objectives of the ICT project flow among the actors and why? 
(What happens at the end of this process?  
b) What factors in the institutional arrangement account for the delay or 
progress of the ICT project and why? (How long does it take, what does it mean in 
terms of time and why? i.e. contract agreements, requirements, etc) 
c) Are changes in the project, if any, caused because the presence or absence 
of particular actor/s (i.e., donors/state)? 
 
2. Methodology 
This study is based mainly on secondary data to illustrate the case of the steps 
involved behind an ICT project and its analysis with a principal-agent perspective.6  
Principal-agent theory is been chosen because it can identify different relationships 
among actors involved (Stiglitz, 1998). Whereas, the role of these actors may 
depend on who sets up the rules and which one is willing to accept them. As a 
result, sometimes the interests of a principal (the donors) can influence the 
interests/objectives of the agent (NGOs). This is because there may be uneven 
situations of information from one actor to the other (Stiglitz, 1998).  It is therefore 
important to look at the objectives of the project to understand if they match with 
the interests of the particular actors involved. 
Principal-agent theory also helps to understand the role of each actor, shedding 
light on the reasons why their objectives are similar or different.  There can also be 
the case (depending on the circumstances) that an actor that is playing the role of a 
principal becomes the agent for another actor and similarly the agent becomes the 
principal for another actor. Such a situation will most probably arise while moving 
down to another stage on the ICT chain. In short, by using principal-agent 
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methodology, the paper tries to analyze whether the original objective of any ICT 
project changes because of the actions taken by different actors in different stages. 
The secondary data for the analysis has been collected through literature review 
from websites and library materials in the Netherlands. The case study was 
assessed on the basis of published and unpublished reports, articles, and other 
material from the studied NGO. Also, some primary data was gathered by 
interviews and email communications with the main actors involved in the project, 
by arranged contact from the NGO. 
Since the study concentrates on the soft structure of information access of an 
ICT project, it does not look at the impact of this project in the communities. 
Therefore, the paper does not pay major attention to the positions of the 
communities or the beneficiaries’ reaction and the way they will make use of the 
information and communication technologies. Rather, it focuses on the ways in 
which these ICT services are provided to the people that need the information in 
the shortest possible time that facilitates the service delivery.7 Looking at the way 
actors operate will assess this service delivery. Therefore, this research will also be 
of help for anyone interested in the role of the actors behind any NGO project. 
Since this work is based mainly on secondary data with the use of the CRFSD 
project’ files, it is imperative to acknowledge that I myself did not participate in the 
process of the material creation, which may lead me to diverse conclusion 
problems. Also, there is always the possibility of not having access to some 
information, even though all the previous negotiation was carried out. The key 
concepts of the study are: Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) -as the ICTs performer of the presented 
case- and their relationships with Donors, State, and MBOs.  This is evaluated with 
a Principal-Agent Theory Analysis. 
 
3. Defining information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) through literature 
‚ICT encompass all those technologies that enable the handling of information 
and facilitate different forms of communication among human actors, between 
human beings and electronic systems, and among electronic systems‛ (Hamelink, 
1997:3). This technology ‘reflects the convergence of digital computing and 
telecommunications’ (Heeks, 2002:1), which are the means to serve the goals of 
the information handling and communication. Different ‘old’ and ‘new’ devices for 
the information delivery such as computer, radio, and telephones among others, can 
hold the use of this technology.  
It is widely believed that ICTs are a means to enhance people’s well-being 
(Heeks, 2002; Schech, 2002; Colombo, 1989). This public welfare is achieved 
through knowledge sharing that enables people to improve their skills as a means 
for empowerment. This empowerment extends opportunities for employment, 
which will improve their life conditions. Evidence indicates that ‘ICTs can be 
highly beneficial to individual communities, projects and countries as under the 
right circumstances ICTs can improve education, health, job creation, governance 
and other services’ (Rodriguez, 2000:5).  
However, merely acknowledging that information can provide many 
opportunities for those who need it is not enough. This information should be 
provided as effectively as possible. There is the belief that for an effective usage of 
ICTs, the question of digital divide has to be addressed by incurring extensive 
investment in the ICT infrastructure. The second critical step is to shift from 
learning to ‘learning-to-learn’, as in the age of modern ICTs, most information is 
on-line, and what is really required is the skill to know what to look for, how to 
retrieve it, how to process it and how to use it, thus transforming information into 
knowledge and knowledge into action (Castells, 2001). Only after such actions, 
which lead to the provision and optimal utilization of ICTs, can it be said that 
information technology causes social well-being.  
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Yet, this involves many underlying assumptions. The most vulnerable set of 
assumptions for ICTs to provide benefits for all people, especially the needy ones, 
is that the information technology should not only be equally available to the 
people from all the stratum of income, but that they are also well capable of 
utilizing it. These assumptions do not hold in reality. Firstly, there is an enormous 
and augmenting partition between the have and have not of ICT infrastructure. As 
Saith so aptly states: 
‚The empirical evidence, revised as it is continuously in order to keep 
track of a fast moving target, all confirm the existence of a chiasmic 
divide: this applies to the different elements of ICTs; and then for 
comparisons between continental regions; within advanced and poor 
economies; within each country to the enormous gaps between rural 
and urban populations; within urban regions to wide divide between 
the megapolitan centres and large cities on the one hand and the small 
towns on the other; within cities to the different categories of suburbs 
that house different social groups‛ (2001:4). 
Thus, there is a clear case of digital divide between and within countries and 
where variations of the wealth distribution are noticeably from rural to urban, 
which hampers the effectiveness of ICTs (Castells, 2001; Colle, 2000).  
Additionally, illiteracy problems and social discrimination prevailing in 
societies limit the use of ICTs even where they are made accessible to a common 
person: ‘Since ICT skills are largely based on literacy, it seems that the vast 
majority of the illiterate population which are largely poor will be excluded from 
the emerging knowledge societies, whereas the worse shall be women who 
constitute the major chunk of illiterates in the world’ (Hamelink, 2000). 
Here then, the question that arises is why there is still a profound gap between 
technology needs and availability in rural areas? How can ICTs fill the gap in those 
deficit areas? These questions lead to a major concern with who is implementing 
ICTs and in what way it is implemented? Since it may be the case that, despite 
good intentions regarding a project, some actors are not playing properly their role. 
To this effect, in order to examine the ways in which ICTs can be delivered to 
people, one has to look at the role of the different intermediaries that play a crucial 
role in its service delivery strategy. These intermediaries can be broadly identified 
as NGOs, Donors and the State. Before analyzing the role of these actors in ICT 
development, it is useful to first understand their general role in the social and 
economic development of a country and also how these actors are linked with each 
other in an institutional framework for the promotion and implementation of a 
development project.  
 
3.1. What are non-governmental organizations (NGOs)?  
According to many authors, NGOs have become important actors in the last 
decades (Biekart, 1999; Edwards & Fowler 2002; Carroll, 1992; Korten, 1990; 
Padrón, 1982, Macdonald, 1997; Smillie, 1995; Thomas & Allen 2000) serving as 
intermediaries for donor agencies and governments by having a strong presence in 
needy communities around the world.  
It is important when analyzing NGOs to understand how accountable they can 
be to the people they are helping. However, a critical definition of NGOs and their 
distinctions must be presented first. 
It is difficult to find an adequate definition of NGOs. They embrace also many 
different organizations ranging from ‚political action committees to sport clubs‛ 
(Carroll, 1992).  
Therefore, a special distinction of NGOs is made between those organizations 
performing developmental assistance and those involved with social commitment 
in ‚grassroots work‛. The former are grassroots support organizations (GSO), 
which are NGOs providing assistance to different communities as intermediary 
agencies (Carroll, 1992). For some authors, these organizations are also known as 
non-governmental development organizations (NGDO), which are also within the 
NGOs category but with an attitude more towards development (Padrón, 1982). 
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Grassroots organizations (GRO) on the other hand are NGOs that are not 
working at the supra regional level as GSO. They are only concerned with their 
own community assistance, thus seen as community organizations (Arrosi et al. 
1999) or ‘peoples’ organizations’ (Korten, 1990). Within these GROs there are 
grassroots based organizations (GBOs) and membership organizations (MO) (i.e. 
member based organizations (MBOs), whereas the main differences between this 
group and the GSO lies in the way they gain their support and their accountability 
structures. GRO followers also call them self-help groups, since they are entities 
that gather their results by making use of their own resources and by assisting their 
own organization or community. Arrosi et al. define self-help as the following:  
…any action undertaken by an individual or group of persons, which 
aims at the satisfaction of individual or collective needs or aspirations. 
The distinctive feature of a self-help initiative or activity is the 
substantial contribution made from the individual’s or group’s own 
resources in terms of labor, capital, land and /or entrepreneurial 
skills… a self-help group is also a membership organization which 
implies that its risk, costs and benefits are shared among its members 
on an equitable basis and that its leadership and /or manager liable to 
be called to account by membership for their deeds’ (1994:45). 
There are a wide variety of classifications according to the nature of entity; 
NGOs can also be grouped as northern non-governmental organization (NNGO) or 
southern non-governmental organization (SNGO) depending on their headquarters’ 
location or from where the assistance is coming from (Bebbington & Farrington 
1991 in Bebbington et al. 1993).  
Furthermore as the term indicates, non-governmental organizations are not 
entities from government, though in reality many NGOs receive funds mainly from 
them (Thomas & Allen, 2000). They become contractors and not independent 
actors, since most are not financially self-sufficient but in need of resources. The 
same situation is seen with donors and NGO relationships. NGOs have been acting 
as intermediaries in developing countries where government or donor funds are 
available, becoming implementing agencies for big donors in the aid chain 
(Biekart, 1999). 
Apart from understanding the typology of NGOs, an evaluation of their work 
should be offered since there are many examples that can be attributed as positive 
and negative effects from the work of NGOs.  
NGOs aim to alleviate problems present in the majority of developing countries, 
especially in rural development (OECD, 1998). Even though these problems can be 
attributed to different circumstances, NGOs have developed different networks to 
improve any existing situation. Today, their work is concentrated in the help they 
can provide to community development. This assistance can be direct or indirect by 
providing resources that were lost by natural disasters or by the introduction and 
implementation of projects to impact a large range number of people. Also, 
communities are relying on them to gain access to resources because of the lobbing 
capacity that many NGOs have, (Riddell & Robinson 1995). 
However, in the majority of cases these NGOs’ projects are pre-designed and 
implemented in the same way all throughout communities. This is because in some 
cases NGOs act as intermediaries to northern organizations or donors that want to 
utilize the same project models in south countries. Hence, the project may not have 
positive impacts (such as local ownership) because of different characteristics and 
necessities of the place where it will be implemented as compare with the one 
where it was first set. As a result, different situations such as cultural and political 
factors can show the disapproval of some NGOs’ work (Rozendal, 2003). Besides, 
many times project developers are not considering other aspects such as 
remunerations schemes, which have negative aspects when leaving apart. As 
Riddell and Robinson suggests ‚well-trained field staff, motivated by a reasonable 
level of remuneration and committed to the goals of the organization, clearly play a 
critical role in successful interventions… poorly paid staff have cause to be less 
committed to the projects they are managing or executing, and will be tempted to 
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spend more project time engaged in moonlighting activities‛ (1995:71). Finally and 
in contrast, projects should not leave behind the idea that ‚too many staff will have 
objectives that are too broad and shallow‛ (Heeks & Baark, 1998:26).  
Consequently, for a better perception there should also be an assessment on 
NGOs accountability.8  Here, the question is to whom NGOs are accountable? Are 
they accountable to their partners, to the communities they target, to donors, to 
governments, or to the coordination bodies in which they participate? To some 
extent they are accountable to all of them, but the unequal power relations they 
engage in must be acknowledged (Carusi, 2003:11). As Thomas & Allen have 
stated, ‚NGOs are in practice more accountable to their donors than they are to the 
beneficiaries‛ (2000:213). Biekart (1999) also argues that in the aid chain the most 
powerful actors are donors (i.e. northern governments) at the top of the aid chain 
and they control strategic decisions in the negotiation process.  
INTRAC work describes this accountability issue by pointing out their concerns 
for the way in which, some local NGOs are being held accountable by 
communities:  
‚After initial enthusiasm for supporting local NGOs as intermediaries 
to empower the popular organizations of Civil Society, questions are 
now being asked about their accountability to these organizations. 
Might they even weaken Civil Society? Have we witnessed a 
disproportionate support for local NGOs at the expense of popular 
organizations… making the latter dependent on local NGOs as 
intermediaries for access to resources? Local NGOs increasingly tend 
to present popular organizations in policy discussions with donors 
and, in turn, have attached a professional middle-class cadre of 
‘experts’. By funding and promoting local NGOs, are we in danger 
not only of encouraging opportunism but also of undermining even the 
more productive role that government might play in developing 
countries?‛ (Bennett & Gibbs, 1996:4). 
On the whole, NGOs’ ties to some actors may lead them to different priorities 
where the course of projects get changed or interrupted. Hence, this difference of 
priorities that may be present in the institutional arrangement is what calls for the 
analysis of the relationships among different actors.  
 
3.2. NGOs, state and donors: An overview 
After going through the above analysis, in this paper NGO refers to 
organizations that engage in providing support to different communities. Therefore, 
the Costa Rica Foundation for Sustainable Development (CRFSD) refers to a 
grassroots support organization (GSO) or Southern NGO (SNGO), and the 
LINCOS community administrative organization is referred to GRO, or MBO 
definition. 
After the end of cold war, bilateral and multilateral lending agencies have 
pursued a so- called ‘New Policy Agenda9’ that identifies NGOs such as GROs as 
one of the most prominent means for poverty alleviation, social welfare, 
democratization and healthy civil society. They are also considered to be key 
channels for the promotion of pluralism and human rights protection.  
At the same time, the developing country states are viewed by these aid 
agencies as generally lacking resources or commitment to ensure universal 
coverage of social welfare for the public. Furthermore, the state’ failures are 
attributed to their interventionist policies.  For example, in ‘rural development 
projects’, the tendency for state institutions to centralize decision-making led to 
growing classes of urban-based functionaries, hierarchical decision making and so 
reduced flexibility and responsiveness and to inappropriate and slow program 
implementation at local level (Ahmad, 2000:15). In short, there are state failures in 
many developing countries due to an inefficient allocation of resources at national 
level, and particularly to rural and urban sectors and private and public sectors. In 
view of the good history of NGOs in providing welfare services to the poor people 
in those countries where governments failed to ensure universal coverage in health, 
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education and security, the new liberal paradigm has scrapped the Keynesian 
model of development where the state and its agencies were assumed to be the key 
vehicles through which projects and policies were implemented.  
Traditionally, donor finance has been channeled into various development 
projects through NNGOs. However, this trend is increasingly changing as the 
SNGOs’ competence and capacity is improving. Now, SNGOs increasingly receive 
funds from many different sources including NNGO partners, international 
foundations and official bilateral and multilateral donors, whereas donors also 
support SNGOs indirectly through NNGOs. The change of focus from NNGOs to 
SNGOs is also due to the fact that this arrangement suits both donors and the 
developing country state. Donors prefer SNGOs because they are assumed to be 
more accountable, better performers, and more effective in strengthening civil 
society in the South than their Northern counterparts (Bebbington & Riddell 1994). 
In the case of NNGOs, the developing country state does not have much 
leverage to address these concerns and might consider their actions a threat to its 
legitimacy or sovereignty. Many NNGOs look to influence southern state policies 
through operational collaboration, lobbying and advocacy. On the other hand, a 
range of interventions can be used by the state to influence indigenous NGOs in the 
South. They can involve restrictive measures like investigation and coordination, 
deregistration or even closure or they can provide incentives like tax exemption 
status, access to policy makers and public funding (Hulme & Edwards 1997).   
 
3.3. Conceptualizing institutional arrangement between NGOs, state, 
GRO/MBOs and donors 
The role of NGOs in economic and social development cannot be understood 
without taking into account the nature of their relationship with other actors that 
participate in the non-governmental social development initiative. This paper 
identifies these actors as the developing country state, donors (including NNGOs), 
NGOs (including SNGOs or GSOs) and GROs (including MBOs). 
Figure 2 below shows the direction of the relationship between these actors and 
the kind of control or influence each of them can have on others. First, it should be 
recognized that though actors may work together, their objectives can vary and that 
one actor might dominate any particular bilateral relationship. The objective of 
each actor can either be categorized as some officially stated goal like poverty 
alleviation and national economic development or there can be some hidden 
agenda like access to foreign markets or simply to influence another actor through 
persuasion, financial inducement or direct coercion (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 2. Actors Relationships 
 
3.4.1. NGO and donors relationship 
For example, in the case of the NGO-donors relationship, the donor’s objective 
can vary according to its orientation. In the context of this paper, donors can be 
categorized into three groups: (a) private enterprises, (b) multilateral or bilateral aid 
agencies or foundations and (c) academic institutions. The objective of private 
enterprises can be to access the foreign market, whereas aid agencies and academic 
institutions would normally work for certain development goals identified in neo-
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liberal economics. They collude to participate in NGO activity in the developing 
country by providing finance, technical assistance (i.e., exchange visits) or other 
material resources irrespective of differentiation in their goals (Hulme & Edwards, 
1997:7-8; Riddell & Robinson, 1995:67). 
3.4.2. NGO and state relationship 
Here, donor initiatives force developing country states to participate in an NGO 
activity to ensure state legitimacy is not weakened. According to Farrington & 
Bebbington (1993), if anything, State and NGOs are ‘reluctant partners’. This 
seems to be the case in many countries, but in many instances the relationships are 
more complex and prone to extreme variations. For example, Bratton (1989) argues 
that African States have generally adopted a control-oriented approach towards 
NGOs. In Kenya, the State is more concerned with larger NGOs present in cities 
and undertaking urban programs whereas smaller NGOs working in remoter rural 
areas and are allowed to operate with a much higher degree of ‘autonomy’ as they 
do not threaten the state (Anangwe, 1995). Though in some other countries the 
state appears to be more flexible, this flexibility is due to the preferences of 
specific regimes (Perera & Wanigaratne cited by Hulme & Edwards 1997). So, 
State and NGO relationships are case sensitive and call for a more detailed case 
study analysis to understand how states envisage different NGOs.  
3.4.3. NGO and GRO/MBO relationship 
The basis of the NGO and GRO relationship comes with the choices NGOs face 
in project implementation. It is up to the NGO whether it wants to involve itself 
directly with individual households or to channel its programs through GROs, 
which make up for more efficient links to the poor. In the case of SNGOs in 
particular, the choice of GRO root matters more as historically their most preferred 
operational mode has been mobilizing community-based organizations (CBO) 
according to a standard format, which these SNGOs believe it optimal because ‚it 
facilitates mass outreach and helps reduce administrative costs‛ (Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997:15). 
However, irrespective of their operational preferences for optimal outcomes, 
Hashemi (1995) believes that the only way for NGOs to be more relevant to the 
poor is if they become accountable to those for whose welfare they are working. 
This is quite contrasting with the general practice where NGOs are seen to be more 
accountable to their donors or for that matter, the state. In short, to be efficient, 
‚NGOs have to make a choice; between the four wheel drive vehicle that comes 
with government licensing and donor funding, and the much harder conditions 
involved in living along side poor people‛ (Hashemi 1995, quoted by Hulme & 
Edwards, 1997:15).  To this effect, ‘the question whether [NGOs or to this matter 
SNGOs or GSOs] are concentrating on their linkages to states and donors to such 
degree that their relationships with the poor are being eroded remains the most 
critical one’. This question will form the basis of our analysis in and the paper will 
discuss the case of the SNGO under investigation ‘CRFSD’, which is also involved 
with other actors creating an institutional interdependence.  
 
3.5. Principal-agent theory:  The research method 
Today principal-agent theory has seen practical application in nearly every area 
of social science. It captures the dynamics of a relationship between two entities, 
two individuals or two parties where one is recognized as an agent because he/she 
is expected to perform certain duties identified by his/her principal who is bound to 
keep part of the commitment towards the agent (Halachmi, 2003). For example, in 
the developing world, institutions like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
can be agents of autonomous funding institutions like the World Bank or IMF or 
public funding agencies like government banks or they can be agents of 
multinationals donors. In short, an agent is employed to act on behalf of another 
called his principal, so that as a rule the principal him/herself becomes bound.  
However, there is a caveat: According to Halachmi (2003), it is impossible to 
observe all actions and decisions of the agent or to infer them by observing the 
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outcomes of agent’s decision. This leads to a principal agent problem, which arises 
because of imperfect information constraints, either concerning what action the 
agent has undertaken or should undertake (Stiglitz, 1998).  
3.5.1. Principal agent problems: Moral hazard and adverse selection 
It is customary to distinguish two types of informational constraints in 
principal-agent theory: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to 
endogenous variables that are not observed by the principal. Stiglitz (1998) defines 
moral hazard crudely through credit relationships between lenders and borrowers. 
According to him, in credit relationships moral hazard arises when the actions of 
the borrower can affect the probability of default. Laffont and Tirole explain moral 
hazard as discretionary actions of actors (i.e., NGO) that affect the cost or quality 
of their project. These discretionary actions can be allocation of perks by the 
managers (hiring personnel to lighten their work loads, inattention to excessive 
inventories of inputs, etc), indulgence in activities that privilege their career 
potential over efficiency, purchase of materials and equipment at high prices are a 
few of the negative efforts arising from moral hazard.  Adverse selection arises 
when an agent has more information about exogenous variables than the principal. 
In general adverse selection allows the agent to extract a rent from interaction with 
the principal even if his/her bargaining power is low. Laffont & Tirole (1993) 
explain that an actor (State, Donor or NGO) is faced by adverse selection when it is 
only known to the MBO or the community whether its cost for a given level of cost 
reducing activity is high or low. Since a regulator, who must ensure that the MBO 
supply certain services, must also guarantee that the MBO is willing to participate 
in implementation and execution of the project (even if it faces intrinsically high 
costs), the MBO must enjoy non-negative rent even if the project they are working 
in is inefficient. This leads to the possibility of adverse selection as the MBO could 
lower its cost-reducing activity below the socially optimal level and produce at a 
high cost that would have been its cost has it been inefficient. This slack provides 
the MBO with more utility that it would have had, had it been inefficient, and 
hence with a strictly positive rent.  
 
4. Setting the scene: An ICT experience in Costa Rica 
4.1. LINCOS - A project description 
As discussed earlier, a series of initiatives related to the application of ICTs has 
been initiated in Costa Rica with the idea of introducing the use of communication 
technologies and making them accessible to the majority of people. As a result, 
CRFSD (also known as Entebbe) in partnership with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and the Costa Rica Institute of Technology (ITCR) initiated the 
LINCOS program in 1998.  
CRFSD was created as a non-profit organization, in 1993. Today, is mission is 
‘to promote the use of technology applications that enhance peoples’ well-being, 
within a framework of Sustainable Development’ (CRFSD, 2004). LINCOS is a 
project meant primarily for the poorest marginal urban communities and rural 
areas, which, according to CRFSD, are the main locations that do not have access 
to technology platforms and other basic technology infrastructures (LINCOS 
[Multimedia] 2000). The LINCOS project involves the installation of a services 
unit, which works as a telecenter10 with multiple applications available to its target 
beneficiaries that are children, adults, small and medium size farmer’s producers, 
local small business, medical patients among others, whereas in full operation 
LINCOS could service over 4,000 people per month.  (LINCOS [Multimedia], 
2000).  
This LINCOS units’ structural design consists of a used shipping container - 
disposed of by a shipping company - that is about 20 feet long and 9 feet wide with 
a canopy added on top to provide shade and water protection. It is modified with 
doors and windows and normally configured with six computer stations and a small 
‘laboratory’ inside (see appendix B for drawings). According to CRFSD, this 
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container box and its size were selected because of ‘its convenience, security, and 
portability,’ by minimizing the environmental impact and benefiting communities 
where it gets permanently installed (LINCOS, 2004). However, in 2003 CRFSD 
decided together with the Digital Nations Consortium11 to change their focus on 
containers by taking LINCOS to second-generation phase following a permanent 
evolution strategy whereby the project services can be placed if the community so 
wants by using: a community center, school (not necessarily recyclable containers) 
in an effort to focus mainly on community and educational aspects (LINCOS, 
2004). 
 
4.2. Project dimensions 
Currently, the LINCOS project is no longer a pilot project and has already been 
introduced in two Latin American countries (Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic) with a total number of 18 units working in different rural communities. 
For example, three units have been set up in three different rural locations of Costa 
Rica12, and the rest have been located since 2000 in 15 different rural communities 
of the Dominican Republic.  
In the case of Costa Rica, LINCOS projects have been implemented through 
donor initiatives, while in Dominican Republic they have been implemented 
through the national government. 
LINCOS units are capable of attending the needs of over 4,000 inhabitants per 
month,13 providing them various services. The following table gives the average 
capacity of a LINCOS unit for the various services it offers, per week, per month 
and/or per year. 
 
Table 3. Capacity of one LINCOS unit 
Type of Service Offered Quantity of People Attended/Unit 
 Per week Per month Per Year 
Educational computers to girls and boys between the ages of 7 an 14 240 1008 12,096 
Educational Information Systems for people 15 years old and older 174 731 8,772 
Lab services use for Educational Information Systems 59 248 2,974 
Information Window and community services 65 260 3,120 
Soil and Water studies -- 20 * 240 
Teleconferences 560 ** 2352 28,224 
Total per Unit 1.098 4,829 77,448 
Note: * It is estimated that the service can be offered to five persons per week; ** There is a 40 
persons capacity for the video conferences, twice a day, seven days a week 
Source: Lincos web site. [Retrieved from].   
 
The Table shows that a standard LINCOS unit makes available various ICT-
oriented services (banking, trade, local agriculture information, etc) to an average 
of 1,739 inhabitants per month, including school students as well as adult 
population living in or near the community where the project is introduced. 
On average, LINCOS can also perform 20 soil and water studies per month, 
which can be utilized for myriad of purposes, i.e., early disease detection and 
sickness control or better agricultural practices. Last but not least, LINCOS also 
contain a teleconference and entertainment component which generally serve a 
group of 40 people, twice a day, seven days a week. This enhances cultural levels, 
creates ‘new’ forms of entertainment and help, giving the possibility of 
communicating with the world (CRFSD, 2004). 
 
4.3. Steps and processes to deploy LINCOS units 
Implementing this project, involves various steps that correspond to the 
execution of a LINCOS unit in a community. These steps and processes are the 
ones constructing the chain under analysis (see Figure 1, in Appendix A) and they 
are outlined as following in detail. 
Step 1: Introduction of the Project 
Process 1: Overall Assessment: LINCOS was the brainchild of CRFSD where 
the original objectives of the project were set up. When the idea was still on paper, 
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CRFSD initiated contacts with donors and government officials of the participant 
countries where the project was to be implemented. National evaluation/surveys 
were undertaken to establish economic, social, technological, cultural educational 
and environmental conditions. At this stage, every community that might 
potentially participate in the project was identified. 
Process 2: Community Assessment and Selection: This activity involved 
evaluation/surveys to identify the communities where the LINCOS units could be 
fully integrated. Each community that could benefit from the project needed to 
fulfill a range of requirements and responsibilities. Once these requirements were 
met, CRFSD together with Rochester University would proceed with the 
elaboration of the community assessment or Rapid Assessment Process14 (RAP), 
carried out in participation with the different actors in the community, with the idea 
of creating a strategic and operative work plan for the project’s implementation. 
Thus, ‚each community will have access to only those applications (refer to 
appendix C, for application details) that are seen feasible for them, enabling every 
LINCOS project to have its distinct features depending on the community 
requirement and CFRSD and its actor’s assessment report‛ (LINCOSa [second-
generation internal file] 2003). 
Step 2: Construction and Installation 
Process 3: LINCOS Unit Construction: As soon as the ‘Assessment and 
Community Selection’ takes place and the relevant social and economic studies are 
initiated, the construction of a LINCOS unit begins. 
Process 4: Unit Transportation: Transportation will begin as soon as the first 
units are ready for shipping to their respective countries/regions. However, prior to 
transportation, there must be a guaranteed site selection that meets the criteria set in 
the original plans. Transportation includes packing and sea or land transportation, 
unit arrival, local transportation to the sites, final deployment on the selected site 
and the final tests. 
Process 5: Community Selection of Administrative Organization and Site 
Preparedness: Here, an ‚administrative‛ member based organization (MBO) needs 
to be selected for the execution of the project as well as the coordinators working 
in different LINCOS’ applications by the community and the CRFSD with mutual 
consensus. This activity also involves the identification of sites where the units are 
to be installed for the selected communities. Besides this identification and 
preparation of the site, the construction of necessary infrastructure such as restroom 
facilities, telephone wiring and tap water among other activities are requested from 
the community. 
Step 3: Economic Sustainability 
Process 6:  Financial assistance: At this stage, different entities interested in the 
project participate. Since ICT projects are costly, the main financial actor is 
generally the government. Nevertheless, operation and maintenance costs are 
generally covered by private actors including companies, foundations and others 
(see tables 3.3 and 3.4 for costs information). 
Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use  
Process 7: Training: This process is done after Step 3 has been accomplished. 
Here the CRFSD provides training to all the LINCOS’ coordinators involved in 
different ICT applications. 
Process 8: Assimilation and use of LINCOS units: Once the previous steps are 
completed, LINCOS is put into operation by making use of the different available 
applications chosen according to community needs. 
Step 5: Monitoring aspects  
Process 9: Monitoring and Evaluation: Regular evaluations are performed to 
ensure objectives of the project match with the identified needs of the community. 
This facilitates better control over those activities that take place along the project’s 
operation. 
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4.4. Required resources for project implementation 
As the financial process indicates, financial assistance must be requested to 
cover the required costs in order to implement the project. Table 4 provides an 
estimation of the base costs of LINCOS (initial fixed costs involved in the 
execution of a standard LINCOS unit).  
 
Table 4. Base LINCOS costs 
Item Costs ($) 
Unit construction 20 000 
Cost of technologies (an average of 35 technologies such as equipment, labs, computer 
programs, material, etc) 
25 000-60 000 
Cost of the preliminary studies (RAP for the communities) 5000 
Cost of training process (average of 6 one-month courses for 20 people) 20 000-50 000 
Cost of the unit transportation to the site and customs duties 5000 
Cost of installation 7000 
Approximate total cost 82.000 to 150.000 
Source: LINCOS project site [Retrieved from]. 
 
According to table 3.3, the base cost to execute a LINCOS project, on average, 
ranges from $82 000 to $150 000, depending mainly on the number of units 
installed, the location of these units, transportation,15 lodging and training of the 
program’s technicians, equipment and, most importantly, the number of 
applications involved (see Table 7, Appendix C). 
In addition, there are some operational (variable) costs that must be considered. 
The most prominent operational costs are land rent/buy to install the unit, power 
supply costs, internet access, and unit coordinators’ salaries (see Table 5 for one 
unit costs). 
 
Table 5. Other Operational Costs 
Item Costs ($) 
Personnel in charge of LINCOS unit 13,100 
LINCOS Operator 4,800 
Assistant for laboratory and video Conference 2,400 
Assistant for heath, environment and Information 2,400 
Technician 3,500 
Publicity 3,500 
Land cost 20,000 
Operative Cost 3,100 
Light 420 
Water 240 
Telephone 480 
Internet 3,600 
Supplies 420 
Gardens 300 
Maintenance 600 
Other maintenance costs 240 
Visitors 900 
Transportation 900 
Unexpected 5% 2,235 
Total 46,935 
Source: CRFSD 2000 [internal file - estimation for one community]. 
 
Because of the high costs involved, CRFSD has mobilized various national and 
international actors to finance each LINCOS project. There are academic alliances 
such as those with the Media Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), Rochester School of Medicine’s Center for Future Health, the Harvard 
Center for International Development, INCAE, Universidad de Costa Rica -the 
University of Costa Rica-, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica -the National 
University of Costa Rica and the Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica -Costa Rican 
Institute of Technology (ITCR)- among others. In addition, there is also the 
contribution of different national and international companies and corporations, 
which form part of the project’s strategic partners. To identify some of them, we 
can mention the Hewlett Packard Corp., Microsoft Corporation, Alcatel, Motorola 
Co. and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica –National Bank of Costa Rica-. There is 
also assistance from the national government as which is an important actor and 
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provides the physical infrastructure that a community requires for the 
implementation of technologies. Lastly, the contributions of some international 
foundations as the Discovery Channel Global Education Fund, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Costa Rica – United States of America (CR-USA) Foundation for 
cooperation, the AVINA Foundation and the Flora Family Foundation are part of 
this project (LINCOS, 2004). 
These actors/project-supporters participate in different ways and their 
contributions depend mainly on the type of application that the project is 
introducing. It should also be noted that not all the actors mentioned above are 
necessarily involved in a particular LINCOS project and that a donor contributing 
in one community or specific country may not be part of another.  
 
4.5. Selecting the main actors from the project 
The participation of actors depends on the specificities of each step and the 
processes required by those steps. Although every actor plays an important role, in 
this paper we concentrate on those who have either provided significant academic 
assistance or a substantial financial contribution to the project and can significantly 
influence in some way the course of the project. 
To justify the selection of certain actors from the project, an evaluation of their 
contributions to LINCOS is presented below. First, a summary of these actors 
participating in each step (refer to steps and process in section 2) is provided in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Primary Actors16 
Steps Actors Involved Contributions: In-kind; Financial 
1. Introduction 
of the Project 
 
 
Center for Future 
Health at Rochester 
University and 
MIT. 
o Rochester University: RAP designs and faculty advisory for this component.  
o MIT: Development and use of Constructionist Methodology17. Participation of 
master and PhD level students in the development of 
applications/technologies for communities. 
2. Construction 
and Installation 
MIT, ITCR  o MIT and ITCR with canopy designs and container’ platforms construction. 
Computer (hardware/software) selection / approval.  
3. Economic 
Sustainability  
 
 
CR-USA, BNCR, 
Discovery and 
State 
 
 
 
 CR-USA: Financial assistance for computers’ acquisition and others devices 
for the introduction of the first LINCOS second-generation concept in Rio 
Frío community. 
 BNCR: Funds requested for services’ provision. 
 Discovery Channel: Videos provision subsidies. 
 State: Dominican Republic Government provided the funds for their 18 
LINCOS units. 
4. Training, 
Assimilation 
and Use 
INCAE  INCAE: Together with CRFSD, training courses. 
5. Monitoring 
aspects 
INCAE o INCAE: Impact evaluations and business trainings. 
 
Source: Author’ own construction by using the information presented in reports, Internet and other 
related sources to the project. 
 
4.5.1. Donors descriptions 
After above selection, a description of the main donors is offered to give a 
better idea of their objectives or mission. 
From academic Institutions:  
The Technological Institute of Costa Rica (ITCR): ITCR is a Costa Rican 
public institution of higher education in technology. It was established in 1971, 
becoming the first technological university in Central America. Its mission is ‘to 
launch strategic actions to consolidate its national and regional leadership in the 
fields of technological education, innovation policies, and transfer of technology 
focusing on productive sectors, regional projection, and potential international 
cooperation’ (ITCR 2004). ITCR became LINCOS strategic ‘partner’ a few months 
later after the CRFSD initiated the idea in 1998. 
The Central America Institute of Business Administration (INCAE): In 1964, 
the business community and the governments of the Central America founded 
INCAE. It is a private, non-profit, multinational, higher education organization 
devoted to teaching and research endeavors in the fields of business and economics 
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aimed at training and instructing from a worldwide perspective. Its mission is ‘to 
actively promote the comprehensive development of the countries served, 
enhancing leadership skills within the key sector by improving management 
practices, attitudes, and values’ (INCAE, 2004). INCAE has been working with 
LINCOS since 2000 by given technical and monitoring assistance. Thus, INCAE 
provides in-kind services to CRFSD instead of providing direct financial 
assistance. For example, master and doctoral students from INCAE come to 
CRFSD installations to carry out evaluations that in most cases are part of their 
research papers.  
The Media Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): The 
MIT Media Lab is both an academic department and a research laboratory and 
operations started in 1985. The research program is funded by over 300 of the 
world’s largest companies, with a total volume of almost $30 million per year 
(LINCOSc 2003 [internal file]). The focus of this research has historically been 
human-machine systems, and now explicitly includes a strong research agenda for 
sustainable development. The Media Lab is a ‘co-founder’ of the LINCOS project. 
The Center for Future Health at the Rochester University: The center for future 
health is a collaborative effort of the School of Medicine at the University of 
Rochester and the MIT Media laboratory (Rochester University, 2004). It is 
dedicated to the creation of a system of intelligent devices that can be used 
worldwide and will enable people to monitor changes in their own health and 
compensate for physical limitations. The center conducts research in a problem-
centered and interdisciplinary way in order to achieve personal health technology 
goals. The idea is that this allows progress to be made in areas where solutions 
require such disparate expertise that standard research approaches fail. Its objective 
is ‘to provide a platform of inter-operability on which to develop a large array of 
health devices for personal use, permitting their clinical testing and then allowing 
rapid transfer to industry’ (Rochester 2004). The center has joined the LINCOS 
project in collaboration with the University of Rochester and MIT since year 1999, 
one year after the project started.  
From Companies/Corporations 
The National Bank of Costa Rica: As a public bank, its mission is ‘to become 
the country’s financial partner by provision of secure and excellent services’ 
(BNCR, 2004). The bank emphasizes activities where it has a clear competitive 
advantage. BNCR was ‘invited’ to become a donor of LINCOS by helping with 
their funds to meet its operational costs in LINCOS, San Marcos de Tarrazú. This 
contribution was to be mainly for the implementation of Discovery Channel videos. 
From International Cooperation Agencies/Foundations 
Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership: Discovery channel recently –
April, 2004- changed its name replacing ‚foundation‛ with ‚partnership‛, thus 
becoming Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership (DCGEP). According 
to them, ‘the latter word more accurately states the nature of the organization’ 
(Discovery Channel, 2004). This is a non governmental organization, a public, 
non-profit entity that works with partners and donors to bring to scale a grassroots 
education project in order to make positive difference in under-served communities 
around the world (ibid). 
DCGEP is dedicated ‚to reaching across the global information divide with the 
tools and training necessary to extend the power of ICTs to under-resourced 
communities around the world‛. Its goal is ‚to bring empowering benefits of 
technology to 1 million children and their communities by the end of 2005‛ (ibid.). 
Currently, DCGEP participation with LINCOS -in some communities- is about 
providing videos support. 
The Costa Rica-United States of America Foundation (CR-USA): CR-USA is 
an innovative bi-national mechanism for international cooperation established in 
1996 and based in Costs Rica. It is a private, non-profit and independent 
organization that manages an endowment of $56 million US dollar, whose purpose 
is to promote cooperation between the two countries, within the framework of 
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sustainable development by supporting projects in technical cooperation, 
technological transfer and capacity building.  Its mission is ‘to promote, encourage 
and develop the broadest cooperation in all fields of human activity between the 
peoples and government of Costa Rica and the United States of America, through 
the exchange of ideas, specialized assistance and technical support, to carry out and 
improve policies and programs that tend toward sustainable development and the 
mutual and general benefit of both countries’ (CR-USA Report 2002:2). CR-USA 
directs its resources to private and government non-profit organizations whose 
goals are in agreement with CR-USA’s requirements. According to CR-USA 
(2004), these organizations have to prove their contribution towards an 
improvement in the national population’s social and individual way of life. CR-
USA’s ties with the CRFSD began in 2002, when they approved $106,618 funds 
for the establishment of a LINCOS second-generation unit in one rural community 
–Rio Frio de Sarapiquí - of the country. 18  
 Community MBO Description: Besides the actors indicated above, the project 
also needs the participation of the local community for project integration. Each 
community will need to join together to form a local administration or MBO that 
directly and responsibly manages the project with the assistance of the coordinators 
from each LINCOS’ application. This MBO and the applications’ coordinators are 
represented in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. LINCOS community MBO 
 
The MBO is the entity locally responsible for the personnel in charge of each 
LINCOS application. Their objective is to delegate functions to the coordinators 
and to control their performance. These coordinators are chosen by the MBO to 
meet the necessities of the community. They are supposed to be a small group 
(maximum 4) whose task is to guide the use of technology and to provide 
maintenance of the equipment. 
In conclusion, there are requirements and responsibilities that need to be 
accomplished between the different actors and the CRFSD. This set of 
requirements and responsibilities might be creating personal ties between the actors 
involved. These interactions can be characterized by a basic set of principal-agent 
relationships existing between the actors. For instance, there is a relationship 
between the CRFSD and its donors; similarly there is a relationship between the 
CRFSD and the MBO.  Here, each of them represents different objectives that can 
be influenced according to the different relations of power exercised by each of 
them (it can be seen in terms of financial resources or in-kind assistance).  
In the next section such relationships will be identified, analyzed and 
highlighted. The discussion will underscore how some these actors -across the 
different sectors (private enterprises, academic institutions, NGOs and State)- are 
interconnected, related to each other, or working together - be it structurally, 
through an individual, or through other common links. 
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5. Analysing Instititutional Arrangements 
‚Principal-agent problem arises whenever one 
individual’s activities have an effect on other 
individual. The question arises under what 
circumstances do these interdependencies arise?‛ 
(Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz 1998: 967) 
 
In this section an attempt is made to analyze the institutional arrangement of the 
LINCOS project, while taking account of the different steps and processes 
involved. Each process and step corresponds to a bilateral or multilateral 
relationship between various actors, which creates the circumstances for the 
principal-agent problems for LINCOS project.  
 
5.1. NGO – donor relationship 
This section will cover those steps and processes (i.e., introduction of the 
project; economic sustainability; and monitoring) that correspond to the NGO- 
Donors relationship. (See Figure 1, Appendix A, for the framework of the 
institutional arrangement). 
Step 1: Introduction of the Project.  
The NNGO and SNGO Relationship and Adverse Selection: Staff of LINCOS 
and Rochester University in collaboration with the community performs the RAP. 
However in this step, community participation is generally in the form of basic 
provision of any required information to Rochester to do the assessment (income, 
work activities etc). There is no active participation in the sense that the 
community is involved with project objectives. They only become involved when 
the LINCOS container is in place and/or setup in the assigned area. Then, the 
community helps with the installation, land cleaning and construction of the 
required infrastructure such as toilets and storerooms. This implies that community 
involvement is for public works only and it does not directly take part in the RAP 
process itself. Late involvement of the community exposes the LINCOS project to 
problems that arise from adverse selection. 
Another relevant issue is the time framework assigned for the community 
assessment before the project is implemented. This consists of 5 days where visits 
to 2-3 communities is necessary, and then an extra 2-3 weeks are used by 
Rochester personnel in their home country (the United States) to write up their 
findings. Afterwards, one member usually comes to Costa Rica to presents the 
results (Soruco, 2002b). Since the assessment results lead to the selection of 
communities and applications introduced by the project it should ideally represent 
community preferences through active community participation so that any 
community specific factors (heterogeneity, differences in age groups, gender 
sensitivity and cultural aspects) are taken into consideration. However, 5 days to 
visit 2-3 communities is definitely not enough time to be able to take into account 
complete indigenous characteristics of each community and to understand their 
needs. Furthermore, since Rochester is a medical institution, its emphasis is on 
health aspects (see chapter III, page 33 for details on Rochester University). This 
gives rise to case specific constraints about community assessments and the way 
they are performed. This particular issue has been realized by CRFSD, which 
concluded that ‚Rochester’s assistance by performing RAPs is over-emphasized in 
health aspects and other important elements from the community generally being 
ignored‛ (CRFSDa [internal file] 2002). However, this implication/ 
recommendation has still not lead CFRSD or Rochester to change their 
methodology for RAP assessment and they are still performed in a similar manner 
to that explained above. This assessment procedure increases the risk of ‘adverse 
selection’ and is a clear constraint since there is not enough time to accomplish the 
project-desired outcomes where… ‚each community will have access to only those 
applications that are seen feasible for them, enabling every LINCOS project to 
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have its distinct features depending on the community requirement‛ (extracted 
from chapter III, page 27).  
Personal Interests: Here the question arises as to why, in the first place, 
community assessments are performed by Rochester which is primarily a medical 
university and why the time frame for the field survey is a mere five days? After 
looking at different scenarios, a possible answer is that there are personal links 
between CFRSD and Rochester. Alex Petland (director of the Media Lab at MIT) 
and co- founder of the LINCOS project took on board Rochester Center for Future 
Health because he is also its co-founder, which meant that it became CRFSD’s new 
‘partner’ after its inception. This contradicts the official line of CFRSD apropos 
LINCOS and its donor selection. According to Dr. Juan Barrios Arce (CRFSD 
executive director), the most important point in the case of LINCOS is to find out 
where and how the project will be implemented in a manner that it…‚helps to 
understand the community needs, therefore implementation costs to than, start 
looking for the right donors‛ (email, June16th, 2004). However, it seems that some 
actors are chosen not because they are relevant to the project but because of 
personal links, thus ‘becoming contractors’ agents instead of independent actors… 
in need of resources (chapter II, page 14). This arrangement between actors fails to 
reflect the needs of communities, by making LINCOS more ‘accountable to its 
donors than its beneficiaries’ (Thomas and Allen, chapter II, page 15). 
Secondly, this five days time could be to reduce costs, since the project has to 
pay Rochester personnel for the duration of their field visits to the community. A 
shorter time in the field means lower costs. Any such costs are not likely to be 
covered by donors other than Rochester or CFRSD itself because Rochester 
personnel generally charge high prices for their field visits (see chapter III, table 
3.3 for details). In other words, the time span of 5 days does not reflect the time 
period required to analyze and assess community needs but budget constraints 
faced by the project. Thus, this time limitations can also reflect reasons for 
communities’ failures (there are illustrative examples that can reveal some of this 
failures and they will be addressed in later sections). A proper time framework 
should be arranged: each community needs different periods of time since they are 
heterogeneous and culture shocks and changes will influence project results. 
Step 4: Economic Sustainability 
In this step, the paper identifies certain factors affecting the economic 
sustainability of the project.  
Time Constraints: As discussed earlier, CRFSD presents itself as an entity that 
‘does not provide funds/ subsidies to communities interested in the project. Instead 
it works as an intermediary actor providing information about potential donors or 
by handing over community financial requests to identified donors (i.e., GSOs). 
However, the funds requested from donors (by the community or through CRFSD 
itself) are asked for a period of 1-2 years. CRFSD sees this as the time necessary 
for the project to take off - for communities to begin project ownership and for it to 
become financially self-sustaining-.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that this is not sufficient for a LINCOS 
project to become self-sustainable. One example is the case of San Marcos 
community where a LINCOS project started in 1999 - more than four years ago- 
and they are still having problems with both fixed and variables costs (see the base 
costs in table 3.3 from chapter III) that the community was expected to have begum 
covering two years ago. Some LINCOS MBO members of the community have 
had to take care of some of them by using their own personal financial resources.  
For example, Don Rodrigo Jimenez Roble (community leader and member of the 
LINCOS MBO) had on several occasions paid the salaries of the LINCOS 
community coordinators.19 
What this reflects is that LINCOS sell-services failed to cover many of the 
expected costs from the project. CRFSD provided one million colones financial 
assistance to help with these costs and to pay back the debt acquired so far with 
Mr. Jimenez.  However, CRFSD simultaneously pointed out that they are generally 
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not responsible for the bail out and they are also not responsible if the project has 
failed to sell their services (CRFSD [letter sent by CRFSD to Mr. Jimenez 
Company (Coopesantos) June 2003). This shows that on the one hand CRFSD 
wants to put pressure on the community that they should not depend on it but make 
the project self sustaining, and on the other hand it recognizes that the project has 
yet to realize its objectives and is still dependent on external finance to sustain 
itself. Additionally, any provision of funds is also in contradiction to CRFSD’s 
own commitments to the project as it clearly advocates that it does not financially 
sponsor any LINCOS units, but instead only assists by redirecting community 
applications to appropriate financing sources (LINCOS, 2004). 
Here the point which arises is why there is a time limit of at most two years for 
the financing of a LINCOS project? One probable answer is that donors often give 
funds for short-periods since in the long run they expect the project to be 
sustainable (from chapter II. page 19). This is the case with the LINCOS project. 
However, a two years time limit for it to become self-sustainable by charging for 
its services is unrealistic and not practical since the project is usually targeting one 
of the poorest communities in poorest marginal and rural areas who generally 
cannot afford to finance any social services. For example, on average, the most 
common cause for non-attendance for the population in rural Costa Rica is that 
they simply cannot pay for it (see graph 1, chapter I). Such communities need more 
time than 2 years to become sufficiently developed to be able to pay for the 
services offered to them. Since the commitment of any donor is not more than 2 
years towards LINCOS project, it appears that LINCOS is facing sustainability 
problems, whereas in reality it is the time limit of 2 years by CRSFD, which is 
unfair and unrealistic.  
Personal Interests and Moral Hazard: CRFSD has also involved actors who 
have no direct link with the LINCOS project per se, such that the association 
between these actors is independent of LINCOS objectives. For example, 
Discovery Channel has been providing videos made by Discovery about various 
geographical phenomenon (i.e., volcanoes) to improve general awareness among 
the public. However, Discovery has charged CRFSD for the provision of these 
videos, which is financed by involving another actor BNCR (the National Bank of 
Costa Rica). This is a NNGO- SNGO relationship. According to Juan Barrios, the 
reason Discovery and CRFSD got involved with each other was because they were 
both interested in the branding of their respective products (Email: September 
2004). On the one hand, Discovery is being branded in Costa Rica as providing its 
documentary videos to LINCOS projects, and CRFSD is being branded 
internationally by getting an international media actor on board. Hulme and 
Edwards work (1997) in chapter II states that such relationships between actors are 
about ‚accessing ‘foreign markets’ and would make a perfect case for moral hazard 
as far as LINCOS project is concerned. 
To know whether the personal interests between CRFSD and Discovery have 
led to moral hazard, let us see if LINCOS has anything to gain from this 
arrangement. The answer is ‘not much’, as Discovery is charging on average 
amount of $14,000 for 2 years’ video provisions to a single-community and the 
theme of most of these videos is not relevant to those communities. For this video 
provision payment, CRFSD has asked for funds from other partners –BNCR-. 
When CRFSD asked BNCR to become a partner by financing Discovery 
assistance, some issues were accorded.  According to the contract agreement, if 
BNCR joins the project by financing these videos, it will benefit from the 
relationship by getting the approval not only to name Discovery as one of its 
partners but also by showing the development assistance they have provided to a 
community. If they want it, BNCR will also have a designed link to their site in the 
Discovery web page. These are incentives provided by Discovery through CRFSD. 
These relationships (CRFSD and BNCR) also include monthly project reports 
being sent to BNCR by CRFSD.  
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Here one can clearly see that the interests of the actors involved are not 
associated with the LINCOS project objectives, and that these various actors carry 
their own agendas. In this scenario, the sustainability of a LINCOS project and its 
effectiveness towards the development and welfare of community can easily be 
questioned. 
The NNGO - SNGO Relationship and Moral Hazard: There is another issue that 
is worth analyzing here, and that is the case of the ‘new’ LINCOS approach, since 
it changed to LINCOS second generation. As already noted in chapter III, this 
approach was initiated in 2002, with the idea of introducing the latest technologies 
in the LINCOS units. This ‘new’ phase consists of putting together different 
perceptions from the project and changes in the applications provided by LINCOS, 
by making use of the attained insights from previous experiences. Moreover, its 
focus is now more on the ‘Communities’ Sustainable Development, leaving apart 
the ‘old’ concept of ‘Hardware’- just computers or technology per se- by 
concentrating on people and their problems while promoting Sustainable 
Development’ (Chapter III pages 24-25). LINCOS second generation, as CRFSD’ 
executive director Dr. Juan Barrios Arce defines it, ‘became a project that can now 
be placed according to communities’ request by using: a community center, school 
and not necessarily the recyclable containers [as original idea was about] in an 
effort to focus mainly on community and educational aspects (extracted from 
chapter III, page 25) making LINCOS suitable for every community’s needs. 
The LINCOS second-generation idea started by ‘bringing’ the project to the Rio 
Frío community, where funds used for this initiative were asked and provided by 
the CR-USA Foundation. Looking closely at the Rio Frio LINCOS project, it 
seems that one of the important reasons for switching to LINCOS second-
generation while focusing it on sustainable development of communities is that 
CRFSD wants to fall in the CR-USA’s general agenda.20 CR-USA is the only 
financial donor for the first ever second generation LINCOS project.  For example, 
according to Juan Barrios, sustainable development is now an issue that needs to be 
part of every LINCOS. As he states in his own words ‚LINCOS Rio Frio became 
the first second-generation unit, where the telecenter concept moved apart, putting 
100% emphasis on human sustainable development‛ (email, June 6th, 2004). 
Notwithstanding this rhetoric, in reality, LINCOS project in Rio Frio fails to 
incorporate the changes which were pre-requisite for a standard second-generation 
LINCOS project. Whereas in the first place these changes were brought into the 
proposed second generation LINCOS model to align LINCOS with the objectives 
of CR-USA’s. For example, the model second generation LINCOS proposes 
options other than the ‘containers’ since they require high operational costs to be 
incurred by the community and have thus been identified as a major constraint on 
sustainable development among communities.  
The second generation LINCOS proposes public buildings instead of 
containers. These community buildings can be schools, community centers etc. 
However, it has been noted that containers are still being used in second-generation 
projects even where there is access to public buildings. For example, the Rio Frio 
community has recently received a second-generation LINCOS project in container 
form despite the fact that it has several public buildings available (i.e., 7 pre-
schools, 60 schools, 3 colleges and 1 special center) (CRFSD, [internal file on 
regions information] 2003). 
So the question arises as to why CRFSD still prefers to install containers instead 
of utilizing public facilities despite high costs that are associated with them. 
According to CRFSD ‚this container box and its size were selected because of its 
convenience, security, and portability… by minimizing the environmental impact 
and benefiting communities where it gets permanently installed‛ (extracted from 
chapter III, page 25). 
Notwithstanding the CFRSD official justification for installing containers, the 
real justification might lie somewhere else. It has been observed that CRFSD’ 
general director and founder, Jose Maria Figueres Olsen (a former Costa Rican 
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president) is the owner of the used containers in this project. During Mr. Figueres 
administration (1994-1998), Costa Rica faced an important change in the way its 
major export commodity (bananas) was transported. Earlier, bananas had been 
transported by train, whereas now they are transported in large containers through 
trailers. Mr. Figures’ family is among few who were the owners of some of the 
companies that are given this new transport services, not just nationally in the 
country but to different countries in Latin America (Dunkerley, 1998: 589-655). 
Today, Jose Maria Figueres is also the owner of a shipping company called 
Melones de Entebbe - Entebbe Watermelons Co.- that exports melons to outside 
Costa Rica by also using these trailers (CRFSD [internal file] 2000). This example 
provides a good explanation why containers are used in LINCOS and in LINCOS 
second-generation despite the fact that it is costly. And besides, the CRSFD claim 
that containers are environmentally friendly can easily be denied as the alternatives 
appear better options environmentally and economically: they are cheaper and it is 
environmentally more effective to utilize vacant public buildings than to bring and 
install a container.  
So now the question arises as to whether the claims by CRFSD to put emphasis 
on sustainable development in second generation LINCOS was only to justify the 
funds channeled from CR-USA. Another question is why CR-USA has failed to 
notice this deliberate violation of project objectives by CRFSD in implementing 
second-generation LINCOS project at Rio Frio. Both these questions suggest that 
the relationship between CFRSD and CR-USA might have suffered from moral 
hazard.  
To unpack these questions, the paper investigates whether there are hidden 
interests among the actors involved. The founding trustee of CR-USA for Costa 
Rica, is Lic. Carmen Maria Valverde Acosta who has a close relationship with Jose 
Maria Figueres. Ms. Valverde was a member of the Costa Rican Legislative 
Assembly during Jose Maria Figueres administration (1994-1998) and also served 
as its Legislative Assembly vice president from 1995-1996. At the time that this 
study took place, she was not only the president of the Foundation namely ‘the 
Cultural and Historical Center’ created by the father of José Maria Figueres but 
also a member of the Board of Directors of the CRFSD-LINCOS project. 
Additionally she, along with Jose Maria Figueres, has been a consultant on new 
ICTs (La Nación, 2004). Such relations between the main actors of CRFSD and 
CR-USA have evidently led to moral hazard.  
Step 6: Monitoring and Evaluation 
In this step, the prominent actor is INCAE with their in-kind contributions to 
LINCOS. INCAE provides its ‘assistance’ to LINCOS by supplying students that 
come to perform monitoring and evaluations from the project. 
Personal Interests and Adverse Selection: Here, both CRFSD and INCAE can 
be seen as agents that are benefiting from what could be called ´mutual alliances´: 
CRFSD gets INCAE students as interns who work for LINCOS, and INCAE is 
assured of a place where students can perform their research. However, one has to 
ask if the ‘partnership’ between CRFSD and INCAE is relevant for LINCOS. 
The interns from INCAE are primarily responsible for working out various 
proposals advising LINCOS on how to get donors (Soruco 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). 
As a result, CRFSD has several proposals for each LINCOS project where each 
proposal tries to target a certain donor by focusing on its specific area of interest. 
For example, any LINCOS proposal for CR-USA would highlight the issue of 
sustainable development because CR-USA works mainly in that area. In short, 
when INCAE representatives are presenting CRFSD with different proposals, they 
are more interested on ‘matching’ donors’ objectives than those of the LINCOS 
project, thus creating the situation mentioned by Thomas and Allen that ‘NGOs are 
in practice more accountable to their donors than they are to the beneficiaries‛ 
(chapter II, page 17). This evidently creates a problem of adverse selection. I will 
now discuss how the INCAE and CRFSD arrangement has made the LINCOS 
project prone to adverse selection. 
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INCAE is a well-known Costa Rican academic institution that became part of 
the Digital Nations Consortium of the Media Lab from MIT. INCAE major interest 
in LINCOS is about knowing the impact that this project has on communities. 
INCAE started an analysis in San Marcos Community with the assistance of 
Angela Casper, who is an INCAE business administration master student. This 
evaluation involved a one-month (June, 2002) community assessment. This 
evaluation is now used as a standard model of the LINCOS project called Historias 
Existosas  (Successful Histories), and is attached to most proposals to target 
donors, showing them community impacts of a standard LINCOS project (Soruco 
2002a). However, I have screened this evaluation report and it turns out that it 
contacted only 3 people from San Marcos community, which include a woman, a 
child and a member of the LINCOS community MBO - Rodrigo Jimenez - 
(CRFSD [file from INCAE] 2002). 
Today, CRFSD is using this evaluation report and assumes it is applicable for 
all LINCOS communities (Soruco 2002a). This is in clear contrast with their claim 
that communities are unique entities, putting the success of any future LINCOS 
project at risk as any community selection and LINCOS project implementation 
based on this evaluation report would be prone to adverse selection. It is also 
important to mention here that, what might be seen as ‘mutual alliance’ between 
CRFSD and INCAE, is actually turning out to be a source of problems with the 
final project objectives. For example, for 2001, the total number of internships was 
40, and in 2000 it was 60 (CRFSD, [internal file LINCOS second generation] 
2003), which was a huge number and as Heeks & Baark suggest it may well be that 
‘too many staff will have objectives that are too broad and shallow’ (Chapter II, 
page 15). 
 
5.2. NGO - MBO relationship  
In the CRFSD–MBO relationship (see appendix A, Figure 1), an administrative 
structure for the project is used. This is going to be analyzed by breaking up the 
chain to look at the CRFSD-MBO relationship. For this purpose, the respective 
steps of the LINCOS project will be analyzed. 
Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use  
The NGO – MBO Relationship and Adverse Selection: This step tends to 
involve cultural factors as major forces that can slow down a project impact if they 
are not taken into account. Therefore, communities can be facing (or going 
through) a process of adaptation that is different in every community, which 
sometimes takes longer periods to assimilate the uses of the project. 
 To exemplify some of the cultural problems faced by communities, one can 
start by looking at the case of Dominican Republic where people complain about 
facing problems in understanding how the LINCOS project can affect their lives. 
To this effect, the following email conversation is relevant. This took place 
between the CRFSD’ educational coordinator (Costa Rica) and the local personnel 
from LINCOS- Seibo (Dominican Republic).  
lincos _seibo (Tue Jul 24 13:31:43 2001):  
lincos _seibo: le decia que cuando llego el formulario, parecia que era un 
documento de una direccion equivocada. [What I was telling you was that when the 
documentation from LINCOS Costa Rica came, it was like coming to a wrong 
direction...meaning, not one knew what to do with it] 
lincos _educacion: por qué [why, what do you mean?] 
lincos _seibo: a lo que me refiero es que hay un problema educativo tan tan 
grande aqui, que los muchachos reciben (en este caso los mediadores) una 
capacitacion, pero en realidad para ellos eso es bla bla (le termino la idea?). [Here, 
we have a very serious cultural problem in relation with educational aspects. 
People (meaning LINCOS personnel in Seibo-Dominican Republic) are receiving 
training that they perceive as useless, because nothing is making sense, it is like 
someone talking a different language… Do you know what I mean? Should I say 
more?] 
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lincos _seibo: es un producto de la educacion dominicana en las escuelas. Las 
teorias, es algo que no se le presta interes [It is a result of the Dominican education 
system…theories, concepts are things that one does not pay attention to and this 
training is perceived like that] ... 
lincos _seibo: ud aqui tiene gente en un auditorio, que le estan diciendo que si, 
que entienden, lo que ud le esta explicando... y ud jamas se enterara que la 
importancia y atencion que tienen para ud es minima. 
[Here, you have people that say yes to everything, making you think they 
understand what you are saying… Never letting you know that attention and care 
for this things are minimum]... 
lincos _seibo: la cultura en su totalidad esta en otro rumbo...se necesita otro 
enfoque. [Here, because of cultural factors, we are going opposition different 
directions... meaning, people are not sharing the same interests in the project… 
There is need for another approach... meaning; we should work this in a different 
way...] 
The email conversation indicates the problems communities face, when such 
aspects are not taken into account. Similarly, when looking at the case of San 
Marcos LINCOS project, LINCOS personnel expressed their feelings about the 
irrelevance of services and the poor quality of the project. This was the case with 
some of the health and environment applications that were not in use at all, since 
the community did not know how to use them and did not consider them useful 
tools for their daily file. The community at San Marcos also felt that they have 
been asked for too much by the LINCOS project and they were not prepared to 
deal with it and felt overwhelmed. Additionally, another problem that can make the 
case for adverse selection in the San Marcos project and that ought to be mentioned 
here is that in that particular project, LINCOS’ MBO meetings were few and when 
they took place, not all members were present, reflecting not much interest in the 
project by the community. This lack of interest made it difficult to propose 
solutions to overcome some problems such as the lack of money to pay LINCOS 
coordinators salaries - and there is evidence that salary problems generated other 
problems -. For example, local LINCOS coordinators were not performing their 
duties efficiently, which further exacerbated coordination problems among the 
personnel. Furthermore, in the absence of salary payments, coordinators felt no 
obligation to do their job or to act in response to any required task. This behavior 
fits Riddell and Robinson’s work (chapter II), which suggests that ‘well-trained 
field staff, motivated by a reasonable level of remuneration and committed to the 
goals of the organization, clearly play a critical role in successful interventions… 
Poorly paid staff have cause to be less committed to the projects they are managing 
or executing, and will be tempted to spend more project time engaged in 
moonlighting activities’ (extracted from chapter II p. 15). [evidence is not 
supporting the analysis] 
Technological Constraints:  Another problem is with the products and 
applications that LINCOS projects offer or introduce in communities. For example, 
in the case of Cutris Community, there were problems with Internet signals (either 
no signal at all or when available it was only for short periods. This was in most 
cases the reason for LINCOS services to be stopped.  Sale of inputs, which rely on 
this application, was in many cases impossible.  In Cutris, those Internet problems 
also created an environment in which LINCOS personnel wanted to resign since 
they had nothing to do. In San Marcos, this situation was quite serious and some of 
the LINCOS coordinators actually left the project because of such hitches. This 
was a great loss for LINCOS and CRFSD since they were from the community, 
had already acquired substantial capabilities working on the project, and their loss 
appeared to have significantly affected project progress (CRFSD [internal file] 
2000). 
There were also problems in LINCOS projects in the Dominican Republic 
(Bohechio region) where containers were closed in the evenings, and remain closed 
on weekends, which made LINCOS units less accessible to their respective 
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communities. Furthermore, a problem arose when LINCOS projects faced high 
costs because they had to buy electricity generators (which are both noisy and 
polluting) because of constant blackouts and power fluctuations in Dominican 
Republic (Shakeel, 2001). Therefore, high electricity costs also forced many 
LINCOS units to open only at daytime, thus excluding the working population who 
were usually free in the evening. 
 
5.3. NGO - state Relationship  
CRFSD executive Director, Dr. Juan Barrios points out in his own words for 
LINCOS project: ‚the best donor is the government, because initial costs are too 
high and basic infrastructure should be provided by government… then different 
enterprise [players] can assist with some maintenance and operational costs‛ 
(Email June 17th, 2004). But why then, is this not the case in Costa Rica. As 
indicated in chapter III, the LINCOS project only works with government support 
in the case of Dominican Republic. 
Political Constraint and Moral Hazard: The reason the government is not 
involved with LINCOS initiatives in Costa Rica is because Jose Maria Figueres 
belongs to the political party (Partido Liberacion Nacional) that lost in the 1998 
elections and the opposition party (Unidad Social Cristiana) has been governing the 
country since 1998-2002 and 2002-2006. As Farrington & Bebbington (1993) 
suggest, ‚if anything, State and NGOs are ‘reluctant’ partners‛ (chapter II, page 
19), and the reluctance of the State to become a stakeholder in the initiative of the 
opposition is well justified.  
Thus, despite believing that the Costa Rican government is the best donor for 
LINCOS, CRFSD had to look somewhere else for money (for example CR-USA in 
Rio Frio) and was forced to provide financial assistance itself as in the case of San 
Marcos, despite proclaiming not to do that.   
The situation in Dominican Republic is different. There, 18 LINCOS units have 
been installed with the assistance of the government. In this case there are no RAP 
performances since the government is the one choosing where the LINCOS units 
will be placed (in which communities) without using the services of Rochester 
personnel. In the Dominican Republic, LINCOS is working in areas that, according 
to Hulme and Edwards, are already identified by the state as those where such 
initiatives work well, designed to help the state target poverty alleviation goals and 
national economic development (chapter II pp.18-19). LINCOS in Dominican 
Republic also fits the arrangement mentioned by Anangwe (1995) where a GRO is 
allowed to work with a high degree of independence without threatening the state. 
In other words, it appears that the involvement of state is important to avoid the 
circumstances, which generally lead to principal-agent problems in the case of 
LINCOS project. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper finds out that the collaboration of CRFSD and Rochester foundation 
has proven to be ineffective because (a) the Rochester personnel, who were called 
in to help select the communities, face time constraint and suffer from 
unfamiliarity with the context even language problems (English instead of Spanish)  
(b) Rochester foundation, which has a health focus, is not equipped to carry out a 
RAP which can cover economic, social, technological, cultural, educational aspects 
of the project and could only focus on the health dimension. Thus any ‘partnership’ 
between CRFSD and Rochester is creating circumstances for adverse selection. 
Here the paper finds out that CRFSD and Rochester are partners because there are 
strong personal ties between the executive bodies of both organizations.  
The paper also suggests that LINCOS is also exposed to exogenous factor, 
which hampers its objectives. For example, there is time limit of 2 years after 
which LINCOS project is expected to be sustainable. The already implemented 
LINCOS projects (i.e., San Marcos and Cutris) suggest that 2 years is not enough 
because generally it takes a lot more time for the community to develop and finally 
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be able to pay for the services. However, this time limit has been the permanent 
feature of every LINCOS project because generally donors don’t provide finance 
for long-term projects. This exposed LINCOS to the problem of moral hazard. 
The paper also finds out that CRFSD itself has suffered from moral hazard as it 
was able to get CR-USA on board by switching the emphasis of LINCOS projects 
on sustainable development by initiating LINCOS second generation. However in 
reality, the LINCOS projects (i.e., Rio Frio) followed same old methodologies 
which were part of the original LINCOS despite having a choice to follow a more 
environment friendly options of LINCOS second generation. For example, the 
second generation LINCOS projects still use containers despite the recent emphasis 
on using public buildings. The paper investigates the reason behind using 
containers and found out that the General Director and founder of CRFSD owns 
these containers and thus he is still emphasizing on container use despite it being a 
costly option to the project. 
Another relationship between the actors that has lead to moral hazard is of 
CRFSD and Discovery who have entered into a partnership to brand them selves. 
There partnership hasn’t bring any good to LINCOS and if anything the costs of 
the project can risen up if CRFSD decides to buy Discovery videos for each 
LINCOS project which in many cases are irrelevant to the communities. 
Moreover, the monitoring and evaluation stage of LINCOS project also create 
circumstances for principle-agent problems i.e., adverse selection. For example, the 
evaluation of LINCOS projects is done by INCAE under the supervision of 
CRFSD.  However, it appears that both actors are partners out of convenience as 
CRFSD places INCAE students as interns in its organization. To date INCAE has 
only done two community assessments on San Marcos and Cutris. For San Marcos, 
I had the access to the data, and it is found out that the community assessment is 
based on three people out of approximately 4000 people. Such community 
assessments are definitely not representatives of the community and tell little or 
virtually nothing about the success or failure of the project. Strangely enough, 
CRFSD claims that this evaluation report represents a standard LINCOS 
community and thus other LINCOS projects should be based on its 
recommendations. Clearly any such approach would expose LINCOS project to 
adverse selection. For example, a community member of LINCOS project working 
in Dominican Republic in Seibo has shown his dissatisfaction over LINCOS 
services and its relevance to the community needs. Similarly in Costa Rica the San 
Marcos and Cutris communities present the same level of dissatisfaction over 
LINCOS project as they considered many health and environmental services/ 
applications provided by the project as irrelevant. They claimed that they cannot 
relate to these services and are not equipped to utilize them. These examples 
clearly suggest that LINCOS project is exposed to adverse selection. 
Furthermore, in Costa Rica the LINCOS project faced political constraint as the 
founder of CRFSD belongs to the opposition. This lead to the minimum 
participation by the current Costa Rican government in LINCOS projects which 
forced CRFSD to find out donors and partners in the private sector or from 
international market. This political constraint in the first place, exposed LINCOS 
projects to moral hazard as CRFSD looked for international donors i.e. Discovery 
case. Some technological constraints, which are inherent to developing countries, 
have further hampered the effectiveness of LINCOS projects. 
Finally, the paper in detail identifies and investigates those circumstances, 
which lead to principle agent problems in LINCOS project. Here these 
circumstances risen due to time and technological constraints and personal 
interests/personal links between actors. Time and technological constraints are 
exogenous factors, which affects the intentions of the actors, whereas personal 
links and personal interests are somewhat endogenous to factors. In this scenario, 
the circumstances of principal agent problem doesn’t rise because of one actor but 
it is rather an outcome of the bilateral relationship or multilateral relationships 
between the actors involved in an ICT project. 
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Well identification of these circumstances is an important step towards solving 
the principal agent problem, and making LINCOS project a more effective one. 
This paper takes this important step and would be of great insight for any body 
who wants to understand what are the inherent problems faced by a LINCOS 
project and how to solve for them or how to avoid them in an effort to make it a 
project which in reality works for the sustainable development of its communities. 
 
s21:  
Notes 
 
1 Is a shorthand term used to describe the widening gap between those who have access to a computer 
and internet and those who do not (Microsoft Melinda Found, 2004). 
2 There are different likes and dislikes for what an intermediary organization can be (Carroll, 1992:9) 
however, in the case of this paper, the meaning will be understand as those actors –whether or not 
with a sense of social commitment- providing some source of support by channeling resources.   
3 Indicating ways of negotiations among actors. For studies of these soft factors such as negotiation 
behaviors, see Schechter1998 and Solomon 1999). 
4 Within this donors’ classification the paper will include: national and international foundations, 
private enterprises and academic institutions. Although, in this paper it is recognize the vast 
differences that prevail between bilateral organizations (northern foundations) and private 
enterprises, and between those and academic institutions. But, they all are included within this 
classification since they are assisting the project by providing funds or in-kind resources that can be 
measured in terms of financial support. Therefore, they become more aid agencies [donors] rather 
than partners [as some of them may be considered by CRFSD]. Lastly, for the analysis purpose, the 
State will be seen as a separate actor, not included within this donor’s classification. 
5 The difference between state and government is well known, however for the present paper the two 
terms are used interchangeably. This CRFSD-State relationship is only about how it works when 
project involves the State directly by ‘purchasing’ the project idea. 
6 See chapter II for detailed explanation of Principal-Agent theory. 
7 ‚Providing a service is just the starting point in a chain of events that should ultimately end in an 
increase in the well-being of users‛ (Carroll, 1992:63) whereas this increase in the well-being can’t 
only be attributed in terms of income. 
8 ‚Accountability is understood as the degree to which members (or citizens) can hold their leaders (or 
politicians, bureaucrats etc) responsible for their actions‛ (Biekart, 1999:305). However, it is 
important to mention that this accountability debate depends merely on the definition given to 
NGOs (Biekart, 1999:38). 
9 ‘New Policy Agenda’ is term coined by Robinson (1993) whose beliefs are based on neo-liberal 
economics and liberal democratic theory (Hulme & Edwards 1997). 
10 ‚The Telecentres consist of a physical infrastructure that allows the access to the information and 
communication services by connectivity‛ (Gómez et al., quoted in There are different types of 
telecenters, one of those are the multipurpose ones as LINCOS, which can provide a wide range of 
applications (ranging from telephony to internet connectivity) for individual, social and economic 
development. It is important to acknowledge that according to CRFSD, LINCOS differs from 
telecenters in some aspects, but for the purpose of this paper LINCOS is going to be assessed as a 
telecenter to facilitate the understanding of its concept.  
11  The Media Lab at the MIT created Digital Nations Consortium in October 18th, 2000. 
12 - San Marcos de Tarrazú community (Southern Region-Rural), 2000. 
-San Joaquín de Cutris, San Carlos (Northern Region- Rural), 2001. 
-Río Frío (Atlantic Region –Rural), 2002.    
13 This capacity is set as a reference by CRFSD as result of LINCOS historical information in 
communities of similar size. 
14It is a feasibility procedure for community assessments, implemented in LINCOS by Rochester 
University. According to Rochester, Rapid Assesment procedures are anthropologically based 
methods –ethnographic interviews, focus groups, and particular observations – which elicit 
descriptive information of a cultural context (LINCOSb [internal file] 1999). 
15 There is also the case that units can be installed outside the home country as it has been done in 
Dominican Republic. Therefore, they get changed if units are installed locally or internationally. 
16 It is important to note that the classification of actors presented in this table was the reality at the 
time of writing this paper. It is possible that positions may have shifted from what they were in the 
past, or may change in the future, such that the actors may find they are misrepresented at a later 
time. 
17 Proposed by MIT and it suggests that users construct –with available computer tools- meaningful 
products and knowledge in order to guarantee log lasting effects in the learning process. 
18 The funds were 38,366,450 colones, which represents $106,617.81 (at the average exchange rate 
according to the Central Bank for the calendar 2002 -359.85 / US$1-). See CR-USA web site for 
details on this at www.CR-USA.org 
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19 In 2003, there was an accumulated debt by LINCOS MBO to Rodrigo Jimenez of around 1 to 1.5 
million colones = $ 3000US (CRFSD [internal file-b] 2003]. 
20 CR-USA mayor focus is on sustainable development, which to them it is the ‘only process capable 
of satisfying the needs of present and future generations without compromising the ability of future 
generations to satisfy theirs’ (CR-USA’s Report 2002: 2) which consequently came also the 
approach used by CRFSD. 
21  Detailed explanation about these steps and its processes is giving in chapter III. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  
 
Figure 1: Actors and Steps forming the Chain 
Source: Adapted by the author from the analysis ‚Stakeholders and aid flows in multiple aid chains‛ 
by Kees Biekart. 
 
In short, the chain of this ICT project and its institutional arrangement involves different steps and 
within those steps many different processes are applied. In an attempt to summarize those steps, they 
would include the following phases21:  
Step 1: Introduction of the project.  
Step 2: Construction and Installation.  
Step 3: Economic Sustainability. 
Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use. 
Step 5: Monitoring Aspects. 
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Appendix B: LINCOS Pictures 
 
 
Appendix C: Applications 
Since LINCOS units are equipped with a group of multifunctional applications they are selected 
for each community according to the recommendations of the assessment report. Each of these 
available applications is briefly described with its services and objectives as follows:  
 
Table 7. 
Application Services    Objectives 
Health and 
Environment 
Telemedicine, clinical and water 
analysis, forestry and soil analysis. 
To promote a healthy environment in communities, 
with the assistance of the local health systems and 
the communities. This by making use of 
technological transfer as a tool to maximize 
communities’ potential. 
Education 
and 
Community 
life 
 Constructionist method 
implementation. 
Videoconference component to bring 
long distance education through pre-
recorded videos or closed circuit TV 
programs. 
To enable empowerment in disadvantage 
communities through processes of constructionist’s 
use.  
Information 
Communicati
on 
Technologies 
Information lab equipped with 
computers connected to the Internet, 
telephones and other services.  
 
To apply the use of new technologies to 
universalize the LINCOS services in communities 
as a tool for local development. 
Technology 
Infrastructure 
Two options: LINCOS Platform or any 
other physical place provided by the 
State.  
To design and construct new applications and 
spaces for the LINCOS communities. 
Business 
platform 
E-commerce, fax services and others 
commercial services.  
To arrange sustainable alternatives for LINCOS 
units. 
Source: Information obtained from LINCOS [internal file] and LINCOS web site. 
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